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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lori Ann Phillips appeals from her judgment of conviction for two counts of
delivery of methamphetamine.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
An informant arranged to purchase methamphetamine from Phillips. (Trial
Tr., p. 28, L. 23 - p. 29, L. 21; p. 31, L. 12 - p. 32, L. 10.) Monitored by police
officers, the informant purchased about an ounce of methamphetamine from
Phillips on March 3, 2009. (Trial Tr., p. 32, L. 11 - p. 40, L. 12; p. 43, L. 11 - p.
44, L. 8; p. 94, L. 18-p. 101, L. 8; p. 124, L. 19- p. 128, L. 11; p. 157, L. 13- p.
166, L. 13; p. 178, L. 11 - p. 180, L. 2; p. 182, L. 8 - p. 190, L. 4; State's Exhibit
1. 1) Police conducted another controlled buy, in which Phillips again delivered
about an ounce of methamphetamine to the informant, on March 12, 2009. (Trial
Tr., p. 46, L.10-p. 53, L.19; p.101, L. 9-p. 104, L.13; p.128, L.12-p.129,
L. 12; p. 167, L. 7 - p. 169, L. 1; p. 190, L. 10 - p. 194, L. 21; State's Exhibit 2.)
The second delivery, on March 12, 2009, was recorded. (Trial Tr., p. 55, L. 17 p. 59, L. 16; p. 61, L. 8 - p. 62, L. 9; p. 196, L. 23 - p. 199, L. 25; State's Exhibits
3, 4, and 6. 2)
The

state

charged

Phillips

with

two

counts

of

delivery

of

methamphetamine for twice delivering approximately an ounce of metham-

1

State's Exhibits 1 and 2 contained methamphetamine and were not, per rule,
provided to the appellate Court. They are cited here merely for reference.
2
Only State's Exhibit 6 was admitted. State's Exhibits 3 and 4 were the
recording before it was edited for admission.
1

phetamine. (R., pp, 102-04; see R., pp. 39-41; 58-60; 90-92.) At the trial the
defense objected to part of the audio recording of the March 12 transaction in
which Phillips and the informant discussed the possibility of future sales. (Trial
Tr., p. 141, L. 11-p. 145, L. 16; p. 146, L.13-p. 147, L. 7.) The jury thereafter
heard evidence that during the March 12 drug transaction Phillips and the
informant discussed the possibility of Phillips selling four more ounces to the
informant in the future. (Trial Tr., p. 199, Ls. 17-25; State's Exhibit 6.)
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. (R., p. 185.) The district
court entered judgment, sentencing Phillips to consecutive terms of ten years
with three years fixed on each count. (R., pp. 203-05.) Philips timely appealed.
(R., pp. 214-16.)

2

ISSUES
Phillips states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the
portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, which involved conversations
between the confidential informant and Ms. Phillips about
obtaining much larger quantities of methamphetamine for a
future sale because it was not relevant and was overly
prejudicial?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed,
upon Ms. Phillips, unified sentences of ten years, with three
years fixed, to be served consecutively, following her
conviction for two counts of delivery of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms.
Phillips' Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of
Sentence?

(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Phillips failed to show reversible error in the district court's conclusion
that further redaction of the recording of the second drug transaction was
not warranted?

2.

Has Phillips failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Phillips Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The District Court's Conclusion
That Further Redaction Of The Recording Of The Second Drug Transaction Was
Not Warranted
A.

Introduction
Phillips objected to evidence showing she and the informant discussed

future drug sales at the March 12 drug sale on grounds that the evidence was
irrelevant and prejudicial. (Trial Tr., p. 141, L. 18 - p. 142, L. 8.) The district
court ultimately held that portions of the conversation between Phillips and the
informant about what third parties owed Phillips for drugs was not admissible but
that discussion between Phillips and the informant about future possible drug
transactions was corroborative of the informant and would assist the jury to
weigh his testimony about the drug transactions.

(Trial Tr., p. 144, L. 11 - p.

147, L. 7.) On appeal Phillips argues that the portion of the recording in which
potential future sales were discussed was irrelevant because "[e]vidence
regarding a larger, possible, future sale does not make it more or less probable
that Ms. Phillips had committed the charged crimes in this case." (Appellant's
brief, p. 5.)

She further argues that the evidence was prejudicial because it

showed she was "very dangerous" and a "substantial threat to society."
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.)
Contrary to Phillips' arguments, hearing Phillips discuss possible future
drug transactions with the informant in her own voice was highly corroborative of
the confidential informant in that it tended to show that he was not the source of
the methamphetamine and that Phillips was, and that probative value was
4

certainly not outweighed by any prejudice attending evidence that the woman
who had already delivered two ounces of methamphetamine would consider a
future delivery of four more ounces.

B.

Standard Of Review
The relevancy of evidence is an issue of law subject to free review. State

v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). Once relevance
has been established, the district court's determination that the evidence's
probative value is not outweighed by unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 603, 809 P.2d 455, 464 (1991).

C.

Phillips Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence That At The
Second Drug Sale She And The Informant Discussed Possible Future
Drug Sales
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence

is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho
544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989).
witnesses is relevant.

Evidence reflecting on the credibility of

State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722

(201 O); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010).
In this case the only direct evidence that Phillips had twice delivered large
quantities of methamphetamine was the testimony of an informant. (Trial Tr., p.
179, Ls. 7-19.)

The informant was cooperating with police in exchange for a

lesser sentence on his own charges. (Trial Tr., p. 180, Ls. 3-20.) With such an

5

obvious credibility problem from the only witness with direct evidence of the drug
transactions, the state's case relied heavily upon circumstantial evidence
establishing that the informant was credible in his testimony about the sales.
Such

evidence

included

testimony

that

the

informant

did

not

have

methamphetamine on his person before going to Phillips' house, that the police
recorded the transactions, and that the informant's actions were observed and
monitored to the extent reasonably possible by the police. (Trial Tr., p. 32, L. 11
- p. 40, L. 22; p. 46, L. 10 - p. 50, L. 19; p. 53, L. 22 - p. 54, L. 11; p. 94, L. 18 p. 100, L. 1; p. 101, L. 15 - p. 104, L. 13; p. 125, L. 17 - p. 132, L. 9.) Evidence
that Phillips discussed future drug transactions during the charged drug
transactions was part of the circumstantial evidence bolstering the informant's
testimony that in fact Phillips sold him the methamphetamine he later turned over
to the police. The evidence was highly probative because, if the informant was
somehow framing Phillips for the sales on March 3 and 12, or if Phillips was only
present and not participating in the sales, it is highly unlikely that Phillips would
be agreeing to consider future drug sales with the informant. Phillips' argument
that evidence of her conversation about potential future drug sales does not
make it more likely that she was in fact participating in a current drug sale as
testified to by the informant (Appellant's brief, p. 5) is without merit.
Nor has Phillips demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion
in balancing probative value against potential prejudice. Pursuant to I.R.E. 403,
relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court's discretion, the danger
of unfair prejudice-which is the tendency to suggest a decision on an improper

6

basis-substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.

State v.

Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho
651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,
656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). "Under the rule, the evidence is only
excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.

The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant

evidence." State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3
(1990) (emphasis in original).
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case.

See State v.

Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908.
Phillips has established no unfair prejudice. She claims that the evidence
painted her as a "very dangerous drug dealer" and a "substantial threat to
society."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.)

The evidence supporting the state's

allegations already established her as a drug dealer, however, who had twice
sold approximately an ounce of methamphetamine to the informant. That she
would plan with the informant future sales of up to four more ounces hardly put
her in worse light. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial as it did not show

7

any plans or proclivity to do anything other than what she had already done.
Even if the evidence could be deemed prejudicial Phillips has failed to establish
that any such potential prejudice so outweighed the probative value of the
evidence that the district court abused its discretion in admitting it.
Phillips' argument that the evidence was irrelevant is without merit. She
has likewise failed to establish unfair prejudice or an abuse of discretion.

11.
Phillips Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court sentenced Phillips to consecutive terms of ten years with

three years fixed on each count of delivery of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 20305.) On appeal Phillips argues that the district court did not "properly consider
the mitigating factors." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Thus, Phillips contends, the court
abused its sentencing discretion when it imposed the sentence and again when it
denied Phillips' motion to reduce the sentence.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 11, 13.)

Phillips' argument fails because she at no point addresses the evidence
presented at the sentencing hearing or the district court's factual findings. (See
Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Review of all the facts balanced by the district court
shows no abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho

8

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838
(2007)).

It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the

defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at
391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576,577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)).
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Phillips must "show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

C.

J..9.:3

Phillips Has Failed To Show That The Sentences Are An Abuse Of
Discretion
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing

discretion, Phillips must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts,
the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment."

3

Because Phillips' Rule 35 motion contained only argument and no additional
evidence or other sentencing materials (Augmentation) the state will make no
separate argument that denial of the Rule 35 motion was an abuse of discretion,
but instead incorporates this issue within the overall argument that the trial court
did not abuse its sentencing discretion when it originally imposed sentence.
9

State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives
are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The
potential sentence in this case was up to fixed life on each count.

I.C. § 37-

2732(a)( 1)(a).
At the sentencing hearing the state presented evidence that Phillips had
been selling methamphetamine on a nearly daily basis for years to several lowerlevel distributors. (Sentencing Tr., p. 7, L. 16 - p. 14, L. 8.) The court found that
the evidence indicated that, after a loss of a business by fire, Phillips had been
supporting herself by methamphetamine sales. (Sentencing Tr., p. 34, L. 23 - p.
35, L. 5.) Phillips fails to mention the evidence and finding that she had been
supporting her "life and lifestyle with the sales of methamphetamine" (Sentencing
Tr., p. 35, Ls. 4-5) in her appellate argument, instead relying on the factual claim
she made (and the district court rejected) that she was only "support[ing] her
habit." (Appellant's brief, p. 9.)
Phillips also fails to acknowledge that the district court expressly
considered several of the factors she argues on appeal are mitigating. The court
considered Phillips' lack of a significant record, finding it "remarkable[J" that it was
so limited. (Sentencing Tr., p. 35, Ls. 6-10.) The court accepted Phillips' claim of
remorse as "sincere and well intentioned." (Sentencing Tr., p. 35, Ls. 11-13.)
The

court

also

expressly

considered

the

pre-sentence

investigator's

recommendation of retained jurisdiction and the mental health evaluation finding
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of a major depressive disorder and amphetamine dependence. (Sentencing Tr.,
p. 35, Ls. 13-19.) The district court found the mitigation of these factors limited,
however, by the fact Phillips ignores: that Phillips had for some time been making
her living from methamphetamine sales. {Sentencing Tr., p. 36, Ls. 3-15.) The
court also found that the harm caused by Phillips' actions in dealing
methamphetamine was considerable and that she was a "significant player in
introducing and spreading that type of destruction into this community."
(Sentencing Tr., p. 36, Ls. 16-24.)
In the end the trial court did weigh the mitigating factors Phillips has
articulated on appeal, and then balanced them with the factors Phillips ignores,
and concluded that a prison sentence was called for. (Sentencing Tr., p. 37, L.
12 - p. 38, L. 13.) Phillips has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction.

DATED this 23rd day of March, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of March 2012, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
ELIZABETH ALLRED
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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